The Turkish-Israeli ties and Iran
Although there are ups and downs in the relationship, Turkey remains the most important partner of Israel in the Middle East. Tel Aviv believes that Tehran should be "prevented from becoming a nuclear power" and that Turkey should be on Israel's side21. Prime Minister Olmert implied in one of his recent visits to Ankara that Turkey can play a co-ordinating role with other Arab countries in Israel's policy of targeting Iran. He also expressed appreciation for Turkey's role in certain problematic issues between Israel and Syria, the Palestinian factions as well as the Black Sea-Red Sea gas pipeline project.

Turkey's wide-ranging co-operation on military and intelligence issues and a plethora of bilateral agreements with Israel are unlikely to lead to any joint action against Iran's nuclear programme. Nobody expects this. In fact, the true nature of military agreements between Turkey and Israel concluded in the 1990s and operational since then have never been clear, although Israel is regularly taking part in the 'Reliant Mermaid' naval exercises and 'Anatolian Eagle' aerial exercise. While the Israeli fighter planes have been conducting training flights in the Turkish airspace from the airbase in Konya, the Israeli commandos have been receiving snow training in the Bolu Mountains for some time.

A recent kidnapping (or defection as it now seems more likely) of the former Iranian Deputy Defence Minister Ali Reza Asgari22 was blamed on Israel. Asgari, who is believed to have information on Iran’s nuclear plans, was on a personal trip and vanished after arriving in Turkey from Damascus. Israeli security experts23 gave some credence to the Iranian allegation that Israel was involved, but they also suggested Asgari had defected. Israel might consider Asgari a prize worth the price of potentially embarrassing Turkey, one of the few Muslim countries to maintain ties with Israel. Indeed, this incident caused a chill in the Iranian-Turkish relations.

In recent months, Ankara has lost some faith in Israel as Tel Aviv prefers a weak and decentralized Iraq, if not a divided one. Turkey’s deepening anxiety about Kurdish aspirations of independence has been fuelled by Israeli interference and training of Kurdish peshmerga. Turks have embarked upon a high-profile diplomatic effort to bolster relations with the Arab and Muslim world, which were blighted by Israel's 1996 military agreements with Turkey. Ankara has moved swiftly to settle its disputes with Syria and is gradually normalizing its relations with Iran.


Energy partnership
Energy trade and investment represent an important dimension of the expanding Turco-Iranian economic co-operation. Turkey’s ability to establish itself as an energy transport hub, particularly in natural gas, will depend partly on an array of intergovernmental business and security arrangements with Iran – a country which has so far been excluded from Caspian/Central Asian hydrocarbon routes.

Many of those interested in seeing Turkey as a secure corridor for Caspian/Central Asian energy wish to develop alternatives to strong reliance on Russian and/or Iranian energy. By 2010, it is expected that 19% of Turkey’s natural gas supplies will be obtained from Iran and 58% from Russia. Turkey has ambitions to become an energy corridor for Iranian, Russian and Central Asian oil and gas to Europe, the Middle East and further afield. Thus Turkey is aware of the need for good relations with Iran to realize its regional ambitions and to maximize its diversification of energy sources24. Ankara and Tehran have already initiated co-operation in natural gas sales and transportation to Turkey and Europe. However, conflicting interests of many actors in energy issues make a smooth bilateral co-operation difficult to sustain.

To start with, Iran does not want Turkey to re-export its gas to third countries25 under a $23bn, 1996 agreement signed when then-Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan visited Iran26. But, Iran often fails to comply with the terms of this deal, reducing the volume (and the quality) of gas it has to ship to Turkey. For example, in the middle of a cold winter, on 23 January 2006, the daily flow of 165,000 bbl/d of Iranian gas to Turkey was decreased to 31,450 bbl/d. Although Iran cited technical failures for the problem, some analysts in Turkey contend that the decrease was Tehran’s way of punishing Turkey because Ankara had just retracted an invitation to Iranian President Mahmood Ahmadinejad. Possible economic sanctions against Iran caused by its nuclear programme could also endanger this co-operation.

The Nabucco gas pipeline, an ambitious project that seeks to diminish Europe’s dependence on Russian gas, involves Iranian gas as well. The 3,300-kilometer pipeline would transport Azeri, Kazakh, Turkmen, and Iranian gas to Romania, Hungary, and Austria. At its nominal capacity, the pipeline would transport the energy equivalent of about 500,000 bbl/d. European support for Nabucco increased in the months following the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute. Notwithstanding Nabucco’s popularity, the project faces both political and economic obstacles. Nabucco presents just one option for Iran to use its gas. Even if Iran opts for Nabucco, Iran’s recent behaviour—indicating it might use gas as a diplomacy tool, much like Russia does— is another impediment to the project.

Another agreement between Ankara and Tehran provides the Turkish Petroleum Corporation with the opportunity to explore oil and natural gas in Iran, an offer Tehran has rejected for more than a decade, while the second is about the transfer of Turkmen natural gas via Iranian territory, a move that is expected to concern Washington which is against bypassing the Caspian in terms of gas transfer.

Ankara and Tehran have also agreed to establish a joint natural gas-powered electricity generation plant on the Turkish-Iranian border. They are upgrading existing power lines and building additional lines. Both sides want to multiply by 2.5 the capacity of the two existing power lines27. Turkish Energy Minister Hilmi Guler explained that both countries would give each other electricity according to their changing needs. They also discussed a barter system under which mutual investments would be paid with electricity, as well as proposals to build dams and natural gas- or oil-fuelled power stations.

Final word
The recent surging influence of Iran in the Gulf, Afghanistan, Iraq and Central Asia has made Tehran a major force to reckon with in any equation regarding this region. Those who have seen Iran as being on the cusp of dramatic internal change have been wrong. Iran enjoys great wealth, is the most powerful external influence in Iraq, and holds considerable sway over both Hamas and Hezbollah. A speculated US attack on Iran might not only fail to destroy all facilities, but it would further radicalize the Arab and Muslim worlds. Military action against Iran would also drive the price of oil to new heights, increasing the chances of an international economic crisis and a global recession.

As a result, Iran's leaders are now remarkably self-confident. To the extent that this attitude prevails, it will be harder to persuade Iran to co-operate with the international community. While the US, the EU, Russia, and China are in broad agreement that the advancement of a military nuclear programme in Iran is unacceptable, they have not yet reached a consensus on how to stop Iran. Russia and China seem genuinely to believe that the most effective means is "inducement," not pressure.

From Turkey’s standpoint, the present Iranian question will not be easily resolved as it is likely to linger on for many years to come, irrespective of the immediate economic or military actions. Failing to respond to the expectations of Washington and Tehran will certainly put Turkey under enormous strain and make it suffer from the permanent state of crises in its neighbourhood. There will also be serious effects on Turkish domestic and foreign/security politics. Indeed, the US debacle in Iraq could drive Turkey, Syria and Iran into each other's arms as all fear chaos and disintegration in Iraq in the coming years.

Whatever the scenario vis-à-vis Iran in the period ahead, a western response to Iran without considering Turkey is unlikely to succeed, independently of other considerations. Turkey, as the most powerful regional power with close ties to both Iran and anti-Iranian major powers, will have to figure prominently both in its design and implementation. Its co-operation with neither Washington/Brussels nor Tehran should not be taken for granted. The long-term national interests and the painful Iraqi experience will likely dictate Ankara’s position, with the full knowledge that Turkey, under any scenario, will be deeply affected from the consequences of actions by, and against, Iran.
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[1] This paper represents the author’s personal views and not those of any organisation he is associated with. Thanks are due to Christiaan van den Hout, Prof. Mustafa Aydin and Rachel Odams who kindly offered suggestions on the text. Ögütçü is currently working for a major energy multinational based in London. A former Turkish diplomat and senior OECD/IEA staff in Paris, he is the author of numerous books including, inter alia, “China’s Quest World-wide for Energy Security” (IEA, 2000), “Eurasian Energy Prospects and Politics: Need for a Western Strategy” (Energy Charter Treaty, 1994), “Asian Energy Security Concerns and Geopolitical Implications for the Middle East, the Indian Ocean and the Central Asia” (IDSA New Delhi: February 2003), International Investment for Development (OECD, 2005), and “A 2023 Dream for Turkey” (2006, Forum Istanbul). He can be contacted at [email protected]
[2] Iran, its neighbours and the regional crises, edited by Robert Lowe and Claire Spencer, Chatham House, August 2006, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/409/
[3] U.S. expects no breakthrough in talks over Iran's nuclear issue, 26 June 2007, People’s Daily.
[4] Iran calls missile threat to Europe 'joke of the year', Tehran, 3 June 2007, AFP.
[5] In order to preserve its relationship with Iran, which is important for political, economic, and security reasons, Russia has protested against any plans to impose economic sanctions on Iran. Since Russia maintains the strongest economic ties to Iran among the current negotiating coalition - including the US, the EU, and China - it will be the most likely to suffer the repercussions of economic sanctions. Russia has established clear boundaries. Should Iran overstep them, Moscow would take a very different approach. Russia does not share US concerns regarding Iran in adjacent regional zones, but rather views Tehran as a strategic partner, especially in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Moreover, Moscow views the preservation of ties and cooperation with Iran—a state that has problematic relations with the West—as a means of ensuring that Russian interests in the Middle East and Caspian regions will be taken into consideration.
[6] China imports around 12% of its crude from Iran (bettered only by Japan at around 14%).
[7] ''Nuclear Iran: Repercussions for Turkey and Saudi Arabia'', Jonathan Feiser, PINR Washington, 28 January 2005.
[8] Iran, as OPEC’s second-largest oil exporter and with its position on the strategically crucial Strait of Hormuz, largely controls the climate of the current negotiations. Energy analysts predict that sanctions on Iranian oil would lead to skyrocketing crude prices that could potentially cripple the global economy. Worst-case scenarios envision U.S. military action that would lead to Iran cutting off its vast oil supplies, with prices at least tripling overnight. Iran initially stated that it would not use oil as a weapon in the nuclear dispute, but a 20 June 2007 statement reminded that Tehran would be ready to capitalise on its position in world oil and gas markets in the event of an US attack.
[9] The United States has never ruled out a military option to halt Iran's controversial nuclear drive, which it claims is a cover for efforts to build the atomic bomb. Iran insists it has a right to uranium enrichment to make nuclear fuel as a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and says its atomic programme is solely aimed at energy generation.
[10] Turkey has witnessed two significant changes in its immediate neighbourhood since the founding of the Republic in 1923. The first wave of change came with the collapse of the USSR and Turkey found itself as a neighbour to the three new states which emerged from the Soviet Union: Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia (if the maritime borders to Ukraine and Russia are excluded). The second wave of change is currently underway in Iraq, to be followed by Iran in the foreseeable future. This continuity in the wave of changes brings about huge risks and opportunities for Turkey.
[11] Both countries send message to U.S.-backed Iraqis: clamp down on Kurdish guerrillas or they will, Louis Meixler, Arizona Daily Star Online, 28 May 2006.
[11] Iran has the world's second largest reserves of conventional crude oil at 133 gigabarrels, although it should be noted that both Canada and Venezuela have larger reserves if Non-conventional oil is included. Iran averages about 1.5 gigabarrels per year.
[13] If a decision is taken to implement economic sanctions against Iran, Turkey’s expanding economic ties will suffer enormously. The most adverse impact of the sanctions will be felt in the transportation sector (each year 15,000 Turkish trucks transport goods to this country and Central Asia via Iranian territory), and tourism (annually 1m Iranians come to Turkey on tourism).
[14] Turkey, Iran move to boost trade, AFP, February 21, 2007. Turks lobby for these to be dropped to 4 percent. These rates (by Iran) reach up to 40 percent in machinery and electronics, 70 percent in textiles and 100 percent in automotive industry. However, average rate of protection implemented by Turkey on Iranian industrial products was below 4 percent. Turkey reminded that Economic Cooperation Organization Trade Agreement (ECOTA) between Turkey and Iran was signed three years ago but it is not in force yet.
[15] http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=164230, 25 February 2007, announced at an Ankara meeting of the Turkey-Iran 19th Joint Economic Commission, co-chaired by the Turkish trade minister Kursad Tuzmen and Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Motaki.
[16] With oil and gas transiting from Central Asia to Iranian Gulf ports, Iran would strengthen its position in the Gulf, essentially in relation to Saudi-Arabia, potentially also in relation to Iraq. Emerging as a Central Asian power would also reinforce Iran's position in relation to the Gulf neighbours.
[17] There are a number of other past regional initiatives involving Turkey and Iran. In July 1937 a Treaty of Non-aggression was signed between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. This treaty was known as the Sa'adabad Pact. The purpose of this agreement was to ensure security and peace in the Near East. In August 1955, a mutual security-pact between Iran, Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan and Britain – called CENTO (Central Treaty Organization), followed in July 1964 by the creation of RCD (Regional Cooperation for Development), aimed at joint economic projects between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.
[18] The PKK, PJAK, and Iran: Implications for U.S.-Turkish Relations, Washington Institute, PolicyWatch #1244, Soner Cagaptay and Zeynep Eroglu, June 13, 2007
[19] 5 February 2007, Turkish Daily News.
[20] True, northerners and southerners differ due to nearly two centuries of separate social evolution in Russian/Soviet-influenced Azerbaijan and Iranian Azarbaijan, but the language unifies Azeris and is mutually intelligible with Turkmen and modern Turkish. The Azeris, like Turks and Turkmens, are traced to the Turkic Oghuz, who moved into the Caucasus from Central Asia in the 11th century, as opposed to the Turkic Kipchak, from whom Kazakhs and Krygizh are drawn.
[21] Israel seeks an alliance with Turkey against Iran, Milli Gazete, 18 February 2007
[22] Iran says West may have seized ex-defence official, Parisa Hafezi, 6 March 2007, Tehran, Reuters
[23]Menashe Amir, an Israeli analyst of Iranian affairs, told Israel's Army Radio he had information indicating that Asgari's family was with him. "It's very possible that he decided to defect," Amir said.
[24] Assessing Turkey’s Future as an Energy Transit Country, Daniel Fink, Research NoteS #11 Washington Institute.
[25] Iran Warns Turkey About Reexporting Natural Gas, 25 February 2007, Turkish Daily News.
[26] The agreement drew criticism at the time from opposition groups over potential ideological motivations on the part of Erbakan's pro-Islamic Welfare Party.
[27] http://www.mmorning.com/ArticleC.asp?Article=4801&CategoryID=6[/b][/i]

Iran and Iranic are among one of the key enemies of Turkics and Turan. So are the Jews.

Of course, anda

Yes indeed, we are living in a country ruled by non-Turks.

Turkiye absolutely should not take part to zionist-Iran conflict. It will be much more bloody war than Iraqi war is now.

 I agree with you in that point brother. However, we can't trust Iran and his lovely regime. Because Persian Mullah supported pkk, other kurdish bastards and shia fundementalist organizations against Turkey and Turk Nation. They are still desiring to spread their Mullah Regime towards local countries and of course Turkey too. In addition they were cooperated with Armenia in Karabagh War.

I'm not sure how much there is Turkic people in Iran, but there is possibility that, if war comes, they might get possibility to take some areas to their control, and then Turkiye should send troops for helping them.

 As our loyal comrade Kızıltamu claimed, there are many Turks(approximately btwn 25-30 million people) who live in Iran.

 Majority are Southern Azerbaijan Turks who are also live in big metropols(Tehran, Hemedan, Erak, Qazvin, Sultaniyah cities) of Iran beside Sotuhern Azerbaijan too.

In the south Regions(Fars and Kerman Provinces, Zagros Mountains), we have Turk Nomad tribes who are numbered huge communities  such as Qashqai, Hamse(formed from Baharlu, İnallu, Nafar tribes), Afshar, Bichaqchu(Bıçakçı in Turkish means Knifed).

 On the other hand Turkman people lived in Khorasan state near Turkmenistan border. This area is called Turkmen Sahra in Shah Regime. However Mullah regime divided this area into two and made including them to the two Persian majority provinces(Mazendaran and Meshed). There are many Turk tribes besides Turkmans too in Khorasan like Teymurtash, Kajar, Qaragozly, Afshar and other Turks who is speaking Azerbaijan Dialect.

 TTK